Abstract: This study examines whether and why companies prefer fair value to historical cost when they can choose freely between the two valuation methods. Historical cost by far dominates the choice of fair value, with the exception of investment property owned by real estate companies. Fair value accounting is not used in practice for plant, equipment, and intangible assets. Few companies use fair value for property other than investment property. Fair value companies exhibit significantly higher book values of assets and rely on debt financing more heavily. This evidence is consistent with fair value companies signalling asset liquidation values to their creditors and inconsistent with equity investors' demanding fair value accounting for non-financial assets.
Introduction
Academics and practitioners have actively debated the movement towards fair value accounting both in the United States (U.S.) and internationally. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has recently announced a roadmap that could lead to the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by 2014 in the U.S. If adopted, IFRS will allow a much wider application of fair value accounting for non-financial assets in the U.S. The aim of our paper is to examine whether and why companies use fair value accounting for three major asset groups: (i) property, plant and equipment, (ii) investment property, and (iii) intangible assets. 1 We exploit changes in accounting practices around the adoption of IFRS in the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany. We focus on the UK and Germany because they have the largest financial markets in the European Union (EU) but are historically at opposite ends of the spectrum in the application of fair value accounting. Under IFRS, however, companies in both countries can freely choose between fair value and historical cost for the three asset groups that we examine. 2 We assume that companies select valuation methods optimally. Therefore, the valuation methods observed in practice can be used to understand what economic factors determine their optimality.
Prior literature posits significant benefits associated with asset revaluations to fair value, including higher value relevance and improved transparency (Sharpe and Walker 1975; Standish and Ung 1982; Aboody et al. 1999; Muller III et al. 2008) . Nevertheless, recently a number of commentators expressed serious concerns regarding the benefits of fair value accounting. They argue that illiquid markets yield unreliable fair value estimates for most assets. The approach we 1 In this paper we use the term asset group to describe the three types of assets examined. Intangible assets, investment property, and property, plant and equipment each constitute one asset group. We use the term asset class to describe a sub-section of an asset group. For instance, property is an asset class under property, plant and equipment. The definition of an asset class is consistent with IAS 16.37. 2 Fair value applied to intangible assets requires the existence of a liquid market.
follow does not involve measuring the benefits associated with fair value accounting for a selected sample of companies that chose to revalue. Instead, we examine the populations of listed companies in two major European economies and document the valuation methods that these companies use in practice, as well as factors that are associated with their use following the mandated adoption of IFRS.
Beginning January 1, 2005 all listed companies domiciled in the UK and Germany are required to prepare their consolidated statements according to IFRS. The new standards provide the same set of valuation alternatives regardless of where a company is domiciled. Yet the companies are departing from very different local GAAP regimes as well as very different institutional environments. In particular, upward revaluations are not allowed for any of the asset groups examined in this study under German GAAP, while under UK-GAAP companies are required to recognize investment property at fair value and are allowed to choose between fair value and historical cost for property, plant and equipment and intangible assets. IFRS expands the valuation methods available to companies in Germany and the UK. Companies domiciled in both countries can either continue with the same valuation method as under local GAAP or they can switch to the other method. IFRS adoption provides the first opportunity for German companies to recognize investment property at fair value and for UK companies to recognize investment property at historical cost.
Our sample consists of the 1,539 companies available in the Worldscope database for which we are able to obtain an annual report prepared according to IFRS. We identify the valuation practice by reading the accounting policy section of the annual report. For German companies, we review the first annual report prepared under mandatory IFRS. For UK companies, we review both the last annual report prepared under UK-GAAP and the first annual report prepared under IFRS to identify companies that change valuation practice upon IFRS adoption.
We find no companies that use fair value accounting for intangible assets in our sample.
For property, plant and equipment we find that only 3% of companies use fair value accounting for at least one asset class. With very few exceptions these companies only use fair value accounting for property. Assets that belong to the plant and equipment categories are valued at historical cost in almost all cases. Examination of balance sheet amounts for companies applying fair value reveals that total assets and shareholders' equity are on average higher by 31% and 88%, respectively, as compared to a matched sample of companies that only use historical cost accounting. These large economic differences, arising from measuring property, plant, and equipment at fair value, highlight the importance of the choice between the valuation methods. The rare use of fair value accounting for intangible assets and plant and equipment is consistent with the lower level of reliability of fair value estimates for these asset types.
An even more striking observation emerges when we examine post IFRS choices of companies that recognized at least one asset class in property, plant and equipment at fair value under local GAAP (i.e., pre-IFRS). We find that 44% of these companies switch to exclusively historical cost accounting on IFRS adoption. In contrast, among companies that recognized all property, plant and equipment at historical cost under local GAAP, only 1% switches to fair value for at least one asset class. Thus companies switching accounting practices upon IFRS adoption are more likely to switch to historical cost than to fair value, a finding that falls short of expectations that IFRS will promote the use of fair value accounting for property, plant and equipment. Rather, the joint evidence suggests that companies view fair value estimates as less reliable.
As for investment property held to earn rental income and/or held for capital appreciation, we find that companies are equally divided between historical cost and fair value applications. The strongest determinant of fair value use for investment property is whether real estate is among a company's primary activities. In particular, among German companies, all of which applied historical cost prior IFRS, we find that the switch to fair value accounting for investment property mainly happens when real estate is one of their primary activities. We observe a mirror image of this practice in the UK, where all companies had to use fair value prior to IFRS, and where the switch towards historical cost does not take place when real estate is a primary activity. More common use of fair value for investment property is not unexpected as investment property is mainly held by real estate companies. Companies in this industry are more likely to observe fairly liquid market values of comparable property. In addition, changes in the value of investment property relate to the performance of core activity when a company is in business of holding and selling property. Since performance measurement is part of many contracts, companies may be willing to trade off the lack of reliability for greater relevance when fair value informs on how successful company's operations were over a period.
We further analyse companies' choice to use fair value following IFRS adoption for both investment property and for property, plant and equipment. We find that companies with higher leverage are more likely to choose fair value over historical cost. Such evidence may seem at odds with the view that debt markets demand more conservative reporting, and it may suggest an opportunistic behaviour on the side of management. Notice, however, that upward revaluations of property, plant and equipment are credited to a revaluation reserve rather than recognized in the income statement. Since most debt contracts exclude the revaluation reserve in the definitions of financial ratios, such contracts are effectively written in terms of historical cost even for a fair value company (Citron 1992a ). When we decompose leverage into its short-term and long-term components, we find that short-term debt is at least as important a determinant of fair value use as long-term debt. Financial covenants that rely on leverage are usually encountered in longer term debt contracts (but are less common in the case of short-term or convertible debt). This also suggests that the choice of fair value is unlikely to be of an opportunistic nature. Since debt contracts are based on historical costs regardless of the valuation choice, the commitment to fair value accounting for property, plant and equipment can be viewed as an increase in information disclosure. Such disclosure is likely to be in demand by debtholders, as fair values inform lenders about companies' private information on the liquidation value of assets when it meets a certain reliability standard. Moreover, the application of fair value is more likely to overstate assets values on the balance sheet and therefore leads to higher litigation risk for the company and its auditor. Since litigation costs are expected to decrease with increasing quality of fair value estimates, it is more costly for a company to recognize subjective and unreliable fair value information. In other words, a commitment to fair value can be a costly way to signal companies' confidence in the estimates.
We further find that companies using fair value accounting for property, plant and equipment possess fewer growth opportunities (as measured by book-to-market net of the revaluation reserve). This result is consistent with the use of fair value accounting to avoid overinvestment in fixed assets with high opportunity costs when few growth opportunities are present. By using fair value accounting, investors effectively force managers to incur rents on the investment's current value, regardless of the time of purchase and their historical cost.
Prior literature has either studied whether revaluations convey new information (e.g., Sharpe and Walker 1975; Standish and Ung 1982; Aboody et al. 1999; Muller III et al. 2008; Easton et al. 1993; Danbolt and Rees 2008) or whether revaluations are motivated by contracting considerations (e.g., Muller III 1999; Brown et al. 1992; Whittred and Chan 1992) . The former stream of literature documents substantial benefits of fair value accounting while the latter provides evidence that debt market considerations motivate revaluations. We contribute to the literature by documenting that despite the benefits identified in prior literature, companies rarely recognize assets at fair value when the alternative of using historical cost is present. This evidence is in line with the contracting efficiency arguments, according to which companies generally perceive the costs of contracting on fair value to exceed its benefits and thus shy away from its use unless observable market prices are available. This is not surprising given that fair value accounting for fixed assets is less likely to reflect the underlying economic performance of an industrial company, is less conservative, and introduces more noise and management discretion. The minority of companies that do recognize assets at fair value are likely to be those less subject to the issues above.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the valuation methods that are available to companies under German GAAP, UK-GAAP, and IFRS. Section 3 establishes the relation between this study and prior literature. Section 4 describes the sample selection procedure and presents the results. Section 5 concludes the study.
Valuation methods under German GAAP, UK-GAAP, and IFRS
This section describes the valuation methods allowed for long-term non-financial assets in Germany and the UK prior and post IFRS adoption. The long-term non-financial assets are comprised of three major groups: intangible assets, property, plant and equipment, and investment property. We define fair value accounting as the commitment to revalue assets every time their book value is materially different from the market value. 3 We next consider the accounting treatment for each of the asset groups.
Accounting for investment property
IAS 40 defines investment property as land or buildings held to earn rental income or to experience capital appreciation, except for property occupied by the owner. Under German GAAP companies must value investment property at historical cost while under UK-GAAP fair value must be applied. Upward revaluations under UK-GAAP are credited to the revaluation reserve in equity and therefore do not directly affect net income. IFRS provides companies with the choice between recognizing investment property at historical cost or fair value. If a company recognizes investment property at historical cost, it must systematically depreciate the acquisition costs and disclose the fair value of investment property in the notes to the financial statements. In contrast, if a company applies fair value, changes in value become a part of operating income and the assets are not subject to depreciation. Thus IFRS broadens the array of valuation methods available to companies in both countries. With IFRS, German companies can either switch to fair value accounting or continue to value investment property at historical cost.
UK companies, on the other hand, can switch to historical cost but can also continue to recognize investment property at fair value (with the modification that valuation changes are recognized in the income statement).
Accounting for property, plant and equipment
The only valuation method allowed under German GAAP for property, plant and equipment is historical cost. Under both IFRS and UK-GAAP, the property, plant and equipment is initially recognized at cost but, subsequently, at each balance sheet date it is valued at either historical cost or fair value (the revaluation model, IAS16.29). Regardless of whether these assets are valued at fair value or historical cost, they are subject to depreciation. When fair value is used, positive changes in the value of an asset are credited to the revaluation reserve, which is part of shareholders' equity. Revaluations, therefore, only affect income through future depreciation charges. Finally, the choice of valuation method under IFRS must be the same for all assets in the same asset class (IAS16.29).
Accounting for intangible assets
Historical cost is the only valuation method allowed under German GAAP for intangible assets. However, under both UK-GAAP and IFRS, intangible assets should be carried at either historical cost or fair value (the revaluation model) less any amortisation and impairment charges. Under fair value accounting, the accounting treatment is similar to that of property, plant and equipment, yet a company may only apply fair value if an active market for the intangibles asset exists (IAS38.75). The definition of an active market is very narrow and does not exist for most intangible assets such as brands, patents, and trademarks due to their uniqueness and specific application (IAS38.78).
Background and relation to prior literature
We start this section by summarizing the opposing views on the benefits of fair value accounting among academics, standard setters, and practitioners. Subsequently, we review prior empirical research examining whether asset revaluations convey new information to the stock market. Finally, we discuss the contracting issues pertaining to fair value accounting.
In recent years we have witnessed an active movement towards fair value accounting by both FASB and IASB. While, currently, the use of fair value accounting in the U.S. is generally limited to financial instruments, it can be applied to a much broader set of assets under the IFRS (see Section 2). At the same time, a diverse set of opinions exists about the use of fair value. understanding of financial institutions. However, with such a view, one important concern is that the measured fair value of an asset is not sufficiently reliable and is susceptible to manipulations by the management. The lack of reliability is attributed to the absence of liquid markets, which can be used as an independent source of verification for potentially subjective fair value estimates. Schipper (2005) argues, however, that fair value measurement does not require the existence of a market in order to be representationally faithful (and thus reliable). In contrast, Watts (2006) criticizes fair value for the lack of economic substance over form, because the true market value is determined by a large number of investors with diverse information, whereas the accounting fair value is not. Some practitioners also express concerns regarding the benefits of fair value accounting. In the opinion of Ernst & Young (2005) , reliability is a necessary condition for the information to be relevant, while it is unclear whether IASB puts sufficient weight on this property.
Conveying information to equity investors
Upward revaluations of non-current assets represent a controversial area in accounting.
The revaluations have generally been banned in the US, and most of the existing evidence is based on Australian or UK data. 4 Several studies examine whether asset revaluations have information content using short window returns. Sharpe and Walker (1975) Several other studies examined whether longer period returns, future cash flows, and equity value are related to asset revaluations (e.g., Easton et al. 1993; Aboody et al. 1999; Danbolt and Rees 2008) . These studies generally conclude that fair value estimates are value relevant, i.e., are correlated with the price of companies' equity. Perhaps the most relevant study in our setting is by Muller III et al. (2008) perceives that the benefits of fair value accounting exceed the costs.
Contracting explanations for revaluations
The proponents of fair value are silent about the usefulness of fair value in contracting, the other major application of accounting information. Brown and Finn (1980) point out the necessity of understanding the economic incentives behind revaluations in order to explain their impact on stock prices. Several studies pursue this task. Brown, Izan and Loh (1992) , Whittred and Chan (1992) , and Cotter and Zimmer (1995) use Australian data and find that revaluations seem to be primarily driven by contracting considerations. In particular, companies are more likely to revalue assets when they are levered up and are closer to violating covenants. This evidence can be interpreted as an opportunistic behavior by the management but it is also consistent with contracting efficiency arguments (e.g., management reducing the probability of inefficient control transfers). Indeed, in the survey of chief financial officers conducted by Easton et al. (1993) , 40% of respondents explicitly indicated that revaluations are aimed at decreasing companies' leverage, arguing that they are independently obtained and thus are credible to lenders. In line with this evidence, Whittred and Chan argue that asset revaluations reduce underinvestment problems arising from contractual restrictions, while Cotter and Zimmer argue that upward revaluations increase borrowing capacity. While debt contracting is the main explanation for asset revaluations, Brown et al. also find that bonus contracts, as well as signaling and political cost explanations, play an important role.
In contrast to prior literature, we do not study asset revaluations. In that setting, companies had a choice whether to make upward revaluations or not, making it difficult to net out how the market reacted to the accounting information per se. In contrast, we study ex ante commitments to revalue assets every time their book value is materially different from the market value. Given that companies determine their accounting policy prior to the realization of their accounting numbers, it is less likely that such a commitment is made for instantaneous opportunistic gain. Furthermore, prior studies examined debt contracting practices in the UK and found that revaluations are generally excluded from covenant calculations. In particular, Citron (1992b) finds that 76% of debt contracts exclude the revaluation reserve in the calculation of covenants on net worth.
Theoretical considerations of mark-to-market accounting
While contracting efficiency is offered to explain companies' choices to revalue assets, there is a lack of theory showing that revaluations to fair value are efficient, particularly for nonfinancial assets. Several recent studies focus on financial assets and highlight important tradeoffs present between mark-to-market and historical cost accounting. Plantin, Sapra, and Shin (2008) show that, while historical costs disregards important new information, mark-tomarket induces endogenous price volatility and is inefficient when applied to long-lived, illiquid, and senior claims. In a similar vein, Allen and Carletti (2008) show that in illiquid markets, marking-to-market the value of financial assets distorts banks' portfolios and increases the risk of insolvency and inefficient liquidation when contagion in banking and insurance sectors is present. In contrast, Bleck and Liu (2007) show that marking-to-market can provide investors with an early warning mechanism while historical cost gives management a "veil" under which they can potentially mask a companies' true economic performance. Finally, Gorton, He, and Huang (2008) study effects of mark-to-market versus historical cost regimes on performance measurement of portfolio managers. They show that asset prices can be affected by mark-tomarket contracts, which in turn causes lower informativeness of the asset prices. Taken together, while fair value is a powerful and appealing concept actively promoted by accounting standard setters, its practical benefits remain to be better understood.
Results

Sample selection and descriptive statistics
Our sample selection process starts with all UK and German (active and inactive) 
Valuation practices
In this section we document how extensive the use of fair value is in the UK and Germany and what asset groups companies recognize at fair value. A company is classified as having fair value accounting if at least one asset class (within a group of assets) is recognized at fair value. Similarly, a company is classified as a historical cost company if at least one asset class (within a group of assets) is valued at historical cost. Appendix A presents examples of fair value accounting and historical cost accounting for property, plant and equipment. A material number of switches take place for this asset group. Specifically, 44% of companies that use fair value for at least one asset class under UK-GAAP switch to historical cost for all asset classes upon IFRS adoption. In contrast, only 1% of companies which use historical cost for all asset classes under UK-GAAP switch to fair value for at least one asset class upon IFRS adoption. This suggests that many companies use IFRS as a convenient opportunity to switch to historical cost.
Valuation practices in the UK
For investment property, fair value accounting is a lot more common after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Nevertheless, 28% of companies still switch to historical cost upon IFRS adoption. Significant industry variation is present. Among financial companies, only 2% switch to historical cost, while for non-financial companies this number is 45%.
[insert table 3] For investment property, we find that 23% switch to fair value upon IFRS adoption.
Valuation practices in Germany
However, there is also substantial industry variation. Among financial companies 49% switch to fair value, while only 6% do so among non-financial companies.
In summary, we find a small number of companies that use fair value accounting for at least one asset class under property, plant and equipment after IFRS adoption. The absence of fair value accounting for intangibles and the limited use for property, plant and equipment in both the UK and Germany suggests that only a small subset of companies perceive net benefits of fair value accounting. In fact, in the UK, where fair value accounting for property, plant and equipment was common under UK-GAAP, we observe a higher frequency of switches away from fair value than switches to fair value upon IFRS adoption. The significant benefits associated with the use of fair value suggested by prior literature (see Section 3) may fail to outweigh the costs for the majority of companies and thus must be specific to companies that self select to use fair value accounting.
Assets recognized at fair value
In this Section, we examine the asset classes under property, plant and equipment that are recognized at fair value. This evidence suggests that the application of fair value accounting in practice is not only limited in terms of the number of companies using it. Companies using fair value accounting only use it for a very limited number of assets. For most companies, property is the only asset class with a market that can establish an independent valuation. Consequently, the reliability of fair values for property is generally higher than that of other asset classes. This potentially explains why property dominates among assets recognized at fair value and is also consistent with the theoretical studies described in Section 3.
[insert table 5]
The effect of fair value accounting on asset values
Companies are required to perform regular impairment tests on asset values when following historical cost accounting (IAS36). An asset is impaired when its carrying amount will not be recovered from its continuing use or sale. The recovered amount is the higher of its value in use or its fair value less costs to sell (IAS36.18). Thus even under historical cost accounting companies will effectively be valuing assets close to fair value if the fair value is lower than depreciated historical cost. Companies that use fair value accounting revalue assets either upwards or downwards depending on the change in the fair value of the asset.
Consequently, the book value of total assets and equity is likely to be higher for companies using fair value accounting. To provide evidence on how material the effect of fair value accounting is on the book value of assets we carry out the following analysis. Table 6 compares the book value of total assets (book value of equity) divided by the market value of total assets (market value of equity) between companies using fair value and companies that only use historical cost. 6 Panel A of Table 6 presents the evidence for investment property, and Panel B of Table 6 presents the evidence for property, plant and equipment. Each company that applies fair value for property, plant and equipment is matched on industry and market capitalization to a company that recognizes all assets at historical cost. We find that on average the ratio of book value of total assets to market value of total assets is 16% higher for companies that recognize investment property at fair value. The ratio of book value of equity to its market value is 27% higher. Among companies that apply fair value to property, plant and equipment, we find that the ratio of book value of total assets to market value of total assets and the ratio of book value of equity to its market value are respectively 31% and 88% higher than those of matched companies that only use historical cost. The differences in the book value of assets and equity in both the investment property and property, plant and equipment samples are all significant at the 1% level. We also examine how return on assets is affected by the use of fair value. As expected, we find a lower return on assets (ROA) in the property, plant and equipment sample among companies that recognize assets at fair value. This is not surprising because on average, fair value accounting increases the value of balance sheet assets. However, at the same time, upward revaluations do not affect the net income. In the investment property sample, we also find a lower ROA among companies that use fair value accounting, but this difference is statistically insignificant. Here, the smaller difference is in fact expected because upward revaluations increase both net income and total assets for investment property.
[
insert table 6]
The evidence in Table 6 indicates that fair value accounting has an economically large impact on companies' balance sheets and causes them to appear less conservative. As the extent to which management has discretion in estimating fair values is substantial, there seems to be a lot of room for misrepresentation of the underlying economics via fair value accounting. This may be among the reasons why few companies adopted fair value accounting following IFRS adoption.
Analysis of the choice to use fair value
In this section we examine companies' incentives to choose fair value over historical cost by analysing cross-sectional variation in valuation practices as well as switches between the methods upon IFRS adoption. We model the probability of fair value application as a function of company-specific characteristics using a logistic regression. The analysis is based on three different subsamples. First, we analyse a subsample of companies with investment property.
Second, we restrict the analysis to a subsample of companies that use fair value for property, plant and equipment matched with a historical cost control group. Third, we analyse a subsample of companies that had an opportunity to use fair value both prior to and after IFRS adoption. The summary statistics for variables used in this analysis are reported in Table 7 . All variables are defined in Appendix B. As the number of observations and the set of explanatory variables differ across subsamples, we report three sets of summary statistics in Panels A to C.
To avoid mechanical associations, we refrain from using the explanatory variables directly affected by fair value revaluations (e.g., book-to-market, book leverage, total assets). Except for investment property for which the data is not available, we are able to overcome this issue by subtracting the (hand collected) revaluation reserve from book value of equity and total assets. where the market for assets is rather liquid (Whittred and Chan 1992; Cotter and Zimmer 1995) .
To shed more light on the issue we decompose leverage into its long-and short-term components, as well as proxy for reliance on convertible debt in Model 3. We find that shortterm leverage is at least as important in predicting fair value. The coefficient on convertible debt is also significantly positive. As accounting-based covenants are less common for short-term and convertible debt contracts, the results are inconsistent with companies opportunistically using fair value to manage earnings around covenants but are consistent with contracting arguments. For example, valuing investment property at fair value when its estimate is sufficiently reliable (as seems to be the case for some real estate markets) can be a better way to evaluate the economic performance and convey the underlying fundamentals. In addition,
recognising fair values in the body of financial statements can be a way to signal to debt holders that fair value estimates are reliable and thus provide credible information about the liquidation value of the collateral. The application of fair value is more likely to overstate the balance sheet amounts and thus implies a higher level of litigation risk. Since litigation costs decrease in the quality of the fair value estimates, it must be more costly for a company to recognize subjective or unreliable fair value information in the body of the financial statements.
Models 4 to 6 of Table 8 replace leverage with alternative variables that are frequently used in debt contracts. 9 We find that the ratio of total debt to operating income is positively related to the use of fair value, while the coverage of interest and the current ratios have the opposite signs. These results confirm the coefficient on leverage and suggest that companies with tighter covenants are more likely to use fair value. Such evidence is broadly consistent with companies signalling the quality of fair value estimates as well as conveying information about the underlying fundamentals when they are more heavily dependent on debt markets. Note that the value of investment property tends to increase over time, and thus companies that access debt markets more frequently are likely to understate book value of equity under historical cost accounting and thus will move closer to covenant violation (as liabilities are close to market value on the balance sheet while the assets are valued at depreciated historical cost). At the same time, we cannot completely rule out the use of fair values to manage earnings around covenant thresholds in this setting. We come back to this issue when we examine property, plant and equipment.
Model 7 and 8 of Table 8 investigate whether dividends affect the choice of fair value.
We document that dividend paying companies and companies with positive retained earnings are less likely to use fair value for investment property. In particular, the coefficient on the dividend dummy is significantly negative and so is the coefficient on retained earnings when they have a positive balance. One interpretation of this result is the following. As changes in fair value of investment property go via the income statement they may substantially amplify earnings volatility, which in turn may lead to interruptions in dividends, e.g., in cases of negative earnings. Since the market interprets interruptions of dividends as a very negative signal, fair value may be less common among dividend paying companies. Alternatively, the level of retained earnings is likely to increase upon fair value adoption and thus may induce pressure from shareholders to start paying out dividends. This, in turn, creates incentives not to adopt fair value.
Property, plant and equipment
We conduct a similar analysis of post IFRS choice of fair value for property, plant and equipment. A few differences, however, need to be mentioned. First, we use annual reports to hand collect the fair value revaluation reserve information. This enables us to compute book values of equity and total assets as if companies apply historical cost and thus we include bookto-market and book leverage as explanatory variables. Second, as the number of fair value companies is low for this asset group, we match each fair-value-company to a historical cost company to improve the credibility of our inferences. We match on country of domicile, twodigit industry code, and the log of market value of equity and use the closest match. Such a procedure requires non-missing market value of equity and results in 90 observations in total.
The sample is further reduced to 87 observations due to data availability.
The results from logistic regression analysis are in Table 9 . Since the match is on country, industry, and size, we omit these as explanatory variables. The coefficient on book-tomarket is positive and statistically significant in most specifications, which suggests that high growth companies are less likely to use fair value following IFRS adoption. In line with prior evidence, we find a positive and significant association between leverage and the use of fair value for both book leverage and market leverage. Further analysis in column (3) reveals that short-term debt is responsible for this association. As for the portion of convertible debt, it is now significantly negatively related to the use of fair value, for which we do not have an explanation. What's more, we find a positive effect on FairInvPr, which suggests that companies that apply fair value for investment property are also more likely to apply fair value for property, plant and equipment. Controlling for this effect, however, does not affect our findings with respect to leverage or book-to-market. Finally, neither dividends nor retained earnings exhibit significance in this setting.
The positive coefficient on leverage confirms our earlier argument that choice to apply fair value is unlikely to be opportunistically motivated. Most debt contracts in the case of property, plant, and equipment contract in terms of historical cost (Citron 1992a) . Unlike for investment property, where changes in fair value flow through the income statement, contracts can easily achieve this by excluding the revaluation reserve in covenant computations in the case of property, plant, and equipment. On the contrary, these results reinforce our prior explanation that lenders have a preference for fair value estimates, and commitment to fair value helps to signal their reliability.
insert table 9]
The positive coefficient on book-to-market is also consistent with a contracting explanation. Companies with few growth opportunities are more likely to make suboptimal investments in negative NPV projects and to hold on to assets with high opportunity costs.
Common accounting metrics, e.g., return on assets or return on investment, are less likely to reflect this under historical cost accounting as the depreciated cost is usually lower than the market value, i.e., value in alternative use (see Section 4.3). Commitment to fair value dilutes the return on assets and makes it more costly for management to hold unproductive assets and thus improves performance measurement if fair value estimates are reliable. Given our earlier findings that in general only the property is being re-valued, this indeed can be the case. Finally, the insignificance of dividends and retained earnings does not necessarily indicate the lack of power as the application of fair value should not have any effect on companies' ability to pay out dividends (the revaluation reserve cannot be distributed as dividend).
Switch sample
This sub-section focuses on the companies that had an opportunity to use fair value under both local GAAP and IFRS and analyse their choices upon IFRS adoption. Thus we restrict the sample to property, plant and equipment in the UK. As we expect companies to optimize with respect to accounting policy both prior and after IFRS, observing a switch from one regime to another can improve our understanding of the underlying economic incentives. Similar to the previous sub-section, we adopt a matched sample design. Namely, we include companies that recognize one asset class at fair value in at least one of the periods (before and after IFRS adoption) as a treatment group and an equally sized sample of companies that use only historical cost both prior to and after IFRS as a control group. The matching is based on industry and log of market valuation and yields one hundred observations in total. We model the probability of choosing fair value in the post-IFRS period conditioned on the use of fair value prior to IFRS using logistic regression.
insert table 10]
The results are presented in Table 10 . The pre-IFRS choice of accounting treatment is the strongest predictor of the post-IFRS choice, supporting the importance of consistency in accounting policy choice (see note 8). Conditional on prior choice, we do not find leverage or book-to-market significantly related to regime switches. This suggests that fair value companies are likely to be different from non-fair value companies in terms of leverage rather than the leverage in itself causing the use of fair value. Note that this is not inconsistent with the signalling explanation, which predicts that only those levered companies that can reliably measure fair value will adopt it. Further, our examination reveals that the relationship between leverage and the choice of fair value depends on the pre-IFRS choice. Companies that used historical cost under UK-GAAP exhibit positive (albeit insignificant) association between leverage and the probability of using fair value post-IFRS. As for pre-IFRS fair value companies, the opposite relationship is implied by the significantly negative coefficient on the interaction between market leverage and pre-IFRS use of fair value dummy. Such evidence is consistent with leverage providing initial incentive to commit to fair value, but once fair value is adopted, the effect of leverage on the choice to continue with this valuation method is weakened.
This may happen because it becomes increasingly costly to use fair value as a signalling device if the leverage continues to grow. In such a case, for example, any legal action against the company is likely to lead to severe financial difficulties. We obtain a similar set of results based on book leverage as suggested by Model 3.
An alternative way to assess the causal relationship between the decision to switch from one accounting regime to another and companies' capital structure would be to examine whether more frequent access to debt or equity markets has an effect on companies' choices. We proxy for a number of times a company accessed debt and equity markets in the prior five years and use these proxies as explanatory variables in Models 4 and 5. We do not find evidence of significant relationship between these proxies and companies' decision to switch.
The final set of results is with respect to dividends and retained earnings (Models 6 and 7). Neither of the variables appears to be significantly related to the probability of switching for fair value. While dividends exhibit a negative association as in case of investment property, retained earnings have the opposite sign.
Summary
We examine the use of fair value accounting for non-financial assets in practice. As companies can choose freely between historical cost and fair value accounting for these assets, the practice we observe should be optimal from the companies' standpoint, allowing us to infer when one valuation method is more efficient than the other.
We examined accounting policies for intangible assets, investment property, and property, plant and equipment of 1,539 companies domiciled in the UK and Germany. Yet with very few exceptions fair value is used exclusively for property. For owner occupied property we find that 3% of companies use fair value, whereas for investment property this number equals 47%. The lack of companies that use fair value for all other non-financial assets is inconsistent with the large net benefits of fair value accounting suggested by prior literature and standard setters. The use of fair value only for property may be explained by the existence of relatively more liquid markets for this type of asset and is also consistent with the absence of reliable ways to measure fair values for other types of assets. The fair value choice for investment property is mainly determined by real estate being among companies' primary activities, which is consistent with historical cost being a less informative measure of economic performance in real estate companies.
We find that leverage is an important determinant of the valuation method choice both for investment property and for property, plant and equipment. This evidence is unlikely to be due to opportunistic motives but is consistent with contractual explanations. In particular fair value can supply lenders with the up to date liquidation value of companies' assets. We also find that companies with lower growth opportunities are more likely to commit to fair value, which is consistent with fair value being used to curb overinvestment in fixed assets.
Overall, our evidence is broadly consistent with companies not perceiving the benefits of fair value accounting to exceed its costs. In cases where fair value is used, however, we find evidence consistent with contracting needs influencing the choice of fair value. For the United Kingdom, the basis of revaluation was the existing use value for properties occupied by group companies and the market value for those properties without group occupancy. For properties outside the United Kingdom, the appropriate country valuation standards were adopted which generally reflect market value.
No provision has been made for the tax liability that may arise in the event that certain properties are disposed of at their revalued amounts. Under UK-GAAP, AMEC's policy was to revalue freehold and long leasehold property on a regular basis. Under IAS 16, AMEC has opted to carry property, plant and equipment at cost less accumulated depreciation and impairment losses. As permitted by IFRS 1, AMEC has frozen the UK-GAAP land and buildings revaluations as at 1 January 2004 by ascribing the carrying value as deemed cost. The impact of this change in policy is as follows: (e) Tangible fixed assets  Freehold and leasehold properties are stated at valuation or at cost. Plant, furnishings, equipment and other similar items are stated at cost.  Freehold buildings are depreciated to their residual value on a straight line basis over 50 years.  Other tangible fixed assets are depreciated to their residual value on a straight line basis at rates calculated to provide for the cost of the assets over their anticipated useful lives. Leasehold properties are depreciated over the lower of the lease period and 50 years and other tangible assets over periods ranging from three to 15 years.  Own labour directly attributable to capital projects is capitalised.
Valuation of properties:
Trading properties are revalued professionally by independent valuers on a fiveyear rolling basis. When a valuation or expected proceeds are below current carrying value the asset concerned is reviewed for impairment. Impairment losses are charged directly to the revaluation reserve until the carrying amount reaches historical cost. Deficits below historical cost are charged to the profit and loss account except to the extent that the value in use exceeds the valuation in which case this is taken to the revaluation reserve. Surpluses on revaluation are recognised in the revaluation reserve, except to the extent that they reverse previously charged impairment losses, in which case they are recorded in the profit and loss account. Any negative valuations are accounted for as onerous leases and included within provisions (see note 20).
Annual report according to IFRS for 2005
The Wolverhampton & Dudley Breweries, PLC Annual report 2006 (page 46).
Property, plant and equipment
 Freehold and leasehold properties are stated at valuation or at cost. Plant, furnishings, equipment and other similar items are stated at cost.  Depreciation is charged to the income statement on a straight-line basis to provide for the cost of the assets less residual value over their useful lives.  Freehold and long leasehold buildings are depreciated to residual value over 50 years.  Short leasehold properties are depreciated over the life of the lease.  Other plant and equipment is depreciated over periods ranging from 3 to 15 years.  Own labour directly attributable to capital projects is capitalised.  Land is not depreciated.
Valuation of properties -Properties are revalued by qualified valuers on a regular basis using open market value so that the carrying value of an asset does not differ significantly from its fair value at the balance sheet date. When a valuation is below current carrying value, the asset concerned is reviewed for impairment. Impairment losses are charged to the revaluation reserve to the extent that a previous gain has been recorded, and thereafter to the income statement. Surpluses on revaluation are recognised in the revaluation reserve, except where they reverse previously charged impairment losses, in which case they are recorded in the income statement.
Panel C: Fair value accounting by German company Annual report according to IFRS for 2005
Hypo Real Estate Group, Annual report 2006 (page 96) 12 Property, plant and equipment Property, plant and equipment is normally shown at cost of purchase or cost of production. As an exception to this rule, land and buildings are shown with their fair value in accordance with IAS 16. The carrying amounts -if the assets are subject to wear and tear -are diminished by depreciation in accordance with the expected service life of the assets. In the case of fittings in rented buildings, the contract duration taking account of extension options is used as the basis of this contract duration is shorter than the economic life. . Panel B presents a matched sample of companies using fair value post IFRS adoption. We match each fair value company to a historical cost company based on country, two-digit industry group, and the log of market value of equity by taking the closest match. Such procedures require non-missing market value of equity and results in 90 observations in total. In Panel C we match companies using fair value for property, plant and equipment in at least one of the periods (before and after IFRS adoption) to an equal sample of companies that use historical cost both prior and after IFRS. The matching is based on industry and log of market valuation and yields 102 observations in total. Note that requiring non-missing values for a particular variable often further limit the sample. 
Appendix B: Variable definitions
